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Case No. 20170815-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

DAVID BRYCE JONES,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
In just over a year, Jones “loaned” himself his then 90-year-old,
demented father’s (David) entire retirement income (nearly $60,000 total) and
ran up another $19,000 in charges on his father’s credit card to pay for Jones’s
living expenses and his two failed restaurants, all while he refused to pay his
father’s assisted-living facility, medical care, prescriptions, or personal items
such as a haircut or bed pads. When the assisted-living facility demanded
payment, and threatened eviction, Jones brushed them off. He said that his
father (who at this point could no longer identify a lion or a rhinoceros)
would have wanted Jones to spend all the money on his failed restaurants. A

jury disagreed and convicted Jones of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary—both second-degree felonies.
Ineffective Assistance claims
“Expert” testimony. Two witnesses testified that David lacked capacity
to read or understand complicated financial documents. According to Jones,
these were “expert” opinions and his counsel should have objected. But these
testimonies were based on the witnesses’ personal observations of David and
reasonable counsel could conclude that they were lay opinions or that any
objection to their qualifications would have been unlikely to succeed (as both
witnesses had advanced degrees and extensive experience in working with
cognitively-impaired adults). In any event, the evidence of David’s incapacity
was overwhelming, so there would have been no reasonable probability of a
different outcome if the testimony from these witnesses had been excluded.
404(b) evidence. In discovery, the prosecution did not give notice that it
would offer 404(b) evidence. At trial, it introduced a lease agreement for one
of Jones’s restaurants and a document showing several loans made to Jones.
Jones says that these documents are 404(b) evidence and his counsel should
have objected on lack-of-notice grounds. But reasonable counsel could
conclude that the documents were not proof of a “crime, wrong, or other act,”
or were intrinsic to Jones’s charged crimes, and thus not subject to 404(b) and
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its notice provisions. Reasonable counsel could also conclude that these
documents helped Jones by lending support to his defense that his father had
loaned him money in the past and wanted to see the restaurant succeed. In
any event, neither document prejudiced Jones as both supported his defense
and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.
Jury instruction. According to Jones, the unlawful dealing statute
requires a knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss element and
his counsel was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. But
reasonable counsel could conclude that the knowing mental state applied
only to the violation-of-duty element, not the substantial-risk-of-loss element.
At least, there was no controlling law to alert counsel otherwise. In any event,
the evidence that Jones knew his actions involved a substantial risk of loss
was overwhelming. So there is no reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different with Jones’s requested instruction.
Merger. Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not asking to
merge his exploitation of a vulnerable adult count with his unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary count because the two crimes are lesser-included
offenses of each other. But exploitation requires an element not found in
unlawful dealing: a vulnerable adult. And unlawful dealing requires an
element not found in exploitation: a fiduciary.

-3-

Other claims
Jones makes two other claims. First, he says that the terms “unjust[]”
and “improper[]” in the exploitation statute are unconstitutionally vague. But
any person of ordinary intelligence would understand that taking all your 90year-old, demented, father’s income (roughly $6,500 a month, including
$900/month from his father’s long-term care insurance policy) to pay for
your living expenses and failed restaurants, while refusing to pay your
father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or basic personal needs is unjust and
improper and thus proscribed by the statue. So the statute, as applied to
Jones, is not vague and he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of
it as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others.
Second, Jones argues that there is insufficient evidence of intent. But
this issue fails for procedural reasons: it is not preserved, and Jones fails to
argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. It also fails on its merits.
At best, Jones shows a dispute in the evidence. But disputed evidence does
not equal insufficient evidence; that is especially true when the evidence on
the guilt side of the dispute is overwhelming, as it is here.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was Jones’s trial counsel ineffective for:
(a) not objecting to “expert” opinions;
(b) not objecting to alleged 404(b) evidence on lack-of-notice grounds;
(c) not objecting to the jury instruction for unlawful dealing;
(d) not moving to merge his unlawful dealing of property by a
fiduciary conviction with exploitation of a vulnerable adult conviction?
Standard of Review. When a defendant argues ineffective assistance of
counsel for the first time on appeal, there is no ruling for an appellate court
to review. The issue therefore presents a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010
UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d 344.
2. Is the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally
vague?
Standard of Review. Constitutional questions are questions of law, but
statutes are presumed constitutional and an appellant must prove
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,
1009 (Utah 1995); see also Stone v. Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115
(Utah 1977) (“[I]t is not within the province of the courts to . . . declare a
statute unconstitutional unless it is determined to be so beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
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3a. Is Jones insufficient evidence argument preserved? And if not,
should the Court disregard it because Jones argues no exception to the
preservation rule?
Standard of Review. None applies.
3b. Was there sufficient evidence to convict Jones of unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary and exploitation of a vulnerable adult?
Standard of Review. A trial court’s decision to submit a case to the jury
is reviewed for correctness, with the ultimate ruling turning on a highly
deferential view of the jury’s role as fact-finder. See State v. Hummel, 2017 UT
19, ¶87, 393 P.3d 314; State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d 1168.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.
David’s declining health
Jones’s father, David, volunteered during World War II where he flew
B25 bombers. R597. His service launched his career. Fascinated by airplanes,
he obtained degrees in civil and aeronautical engineering and later worked
for the Air Force, Lockheed, and Boeing in locations that included Greece and
Saudi Arabia. R598.
As David aged, his mental health declined. His younger brother, Ken,
first noticed it around 2005. R599–600. At that time, David was 81 years old.
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R805, 851. During a visit that year, David did not recognize Ken and was
“noticeably disoriented.” R600. In later phone calls, David didn’t know who
he was talking with and “wasn’t entirely with it.” Id.
Five years later, at age 86, David signed a power of attorney that gave
his only child, Jones, broad authority, including control of David’s finances
and health-related decisions. R805–06, SE24. At this point, Jones admitted his
father was already exhibiting signs of dementia. R808. The power of attorney
gave Jones power, among other things, to contract for his father’s medical
care and pay reasonable compensation for it. R834, SE24. It also required
Jones to act in his father’s best interest, which Jones understood. R834, SE24.
Two years later, at age 88, Jones said his father was “incompetent,” or
at least arguably so, due to his “progressive dementia.” R835–36, 838, 839–
840, SE23.
Brewhaha
A year later, Jones pushed ahead with his plans to open a restaurant,
Brewhaha. R804. According to Jones, he and his father were business partners
and the restaurant was something both wanted. Id. Jones found a Sugarhouse
property, and although the proposed lease was “incredibly unfair” with
“harsh provisions,” and even though the prior tenant warned him about the
landlord and Jones called the landlord a “real snake” and a “horrible person”
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Jones chose to sign it. R807, 836. The landlord insisted that David sign the
lease too as a tenant and a personal guarantor. R836–37. So Jones, despite
David’s incompetence, had him sign. R836, 838–40, SE23.
While Jones said that his father was his “partner,” his father had no
ownership in the restaurant despite contributing most of the money. R735–
36, 811, 838.
David is admitted to Highland Cove
Six months later, while alone at his St. George home, David became
dehydrated and disoriented. R812. Some friends took him to the hospital.
R812. After three nights, and twenty days of rehabilitation, it was determined
that David could no longer live on his own. Id.
Jones arranged for his father to move to Highland Cove, an assisted
living facility. R813. He filled out the admission paperwork where he noted
that David suffered from “progressive dementia.” R516, 536, SE1. He then
signed an agreement to pay $3,000 a month for David’s rent and care. SE2.
This amount did not include other personal expenses such as medications, a
haircut, toothpaste, and the like. R523, SE3.
Cody Tower, Highland Cove’s manager, interacted with David daily.
R534. Tower said that David’s dementia was “obvious.” R536. As an example,
David stopped by Tower’s office on his first day and “was having difficulty
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finding words for what he was trying to say.” R535. Tower followed David
back to his room where David pointed at his pants pocket. Id. Eventually,
Tower learned that David had lost his wallet, but David had been unable to
express that in words. Id.
There were other signs too. David struggled to answer basic questions
(R558–59), or to converse beyond an exchange of the most basic pleasantries,
such as “hello” and “how are you” (R536, 538), and could no longer make his
own food or bathe or dress himself. R557.
The Loan Document
Three weeks after admission to Highland Cove, Jones had his father
sign a document authorizing Jones to loan himself money from his father’s
retirement income (Loan Document). SE16. The loan could be for business or
personal use and there was “no limit” on the amount so long as David’s
physical and medical needs were met. Id. The Loan Document required Jones
to keep records of each loan and to pay five-percent interest. Id.
Jones “loans” himself David’s retirement income
David made good money in retirement. He had a civil service pension,
social security, retirement from Boeing, and a long-term care policy designed
to pay for David’s stay at a facility like Highland Cove. R584, 660–61. These
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sources totaled $6,500 a month, more than double what was needed to pay
Highland Cove. R661–62.
Each month after securing the Loan Document, Jones “loaned” himself
his father’s retirement income (including his father’s long-term care
insurance) to pay for Brewhaha’s renovation and operation. R820, 824–25,
853. Also, as Jones did not have income of his own, he “loaned” himself
money to pay for his living expenses. R810. Jones kept no record of these
loans. R846–48.
Jones fails to pay Highland Cove
These “loans” left no money to pay for his father’s care. Jones missed
payments to Highland Cove in December, January, February, and March as
David’s account balance ballooned to $14,967.97. R521, SE3. He also failed to
pay for his father’s prescriptions or basic hygiene items like a toothbrush, a
haircut, or bed pads. R523, 543, 573, SE3.
Highland Cove sent monthly bills and statements to Jones. R518–19,
556, SE3. It also called, left voicemails, and spoke with him in person about
the need to pay for his father’s care. R522, 541–42. Jones explained that he had
started a restaurant, Brewhaha, and was having cash flow problems. R546,
552, 820, 824. Each time, Jones promised that payment would be forthcoming.
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R542. At no point did Highland Cove agree to let Jones miss payments. R548–
49, 553.
Tired of the promises of payment, Highland Cove sent Jones an
eviction notice. R543–44, SE4. It said that it had “reached out to [Jones] to
make arrangements to get [his father’s] account brought to a current status,”
had assisted him in making claims on his father’s long-term care policy, and
had been “lenient” with late fees. SE4. But it could do so no longer. Id. It
demanded that Jones either bring his father’s account current or vacate the
apartment within 30 days. Id.
Jones ignored the notice. He didn’t vacate or make payments; in fact,
he missed two more (May and June). R544, SE3.1
This put Highland Cove in a difficult spot. It could not kick out a 90year-old, demented man with no ability to care for himself. R544–45. In these
situations, Highland Cove typically works with the State to try and get David
financial assistance to either stay at Highland Cove or go to another facility.
Id.

A $3,000 payment was made in April, but Jones said that he never
made that payment and believed it was an accounting error. R819–20.
1
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Brewhaha fails, Jones starts another restaurant
About the same time as the eviction notice, Brewhaha’s landlord filed
suit against Jones, David, and Foothill Management, Jones’s LLC. SE23. Jones
was more than $10,000 behind in rent and had ignored the landlord’s request
to vacate the property. Id.
In this action, Jones filed a pro se motion to dismiss his father. SE23. He
alleged that his father was under “24-hour a day supervision for progressive
dementia, for which he has been suffering for several years,” since at least
2012 (which was a year before he had his father sign the Loan Document),
“and was not competent to sign either [the] lease or the personal guarantee.”
R839–40, SE23; see SE16 (showing Loan Document signed in November 2013).
“Due to his condition,” Jones continued, “[his father] has no knowledge or
comprehension of the eviction . . . and has no competence to participate in
this case.” Id.
The lawsuit resulted in a six-figure judgment against Jones. R807.
Undeterred by Brewhaha’s failure, the lawsuit, judgment, or Highland
Cove’s eviction notice, Jones opened another restaurant, Gusto. R765, 822–23,
851–53. Like Brewhaha, Jones used his father’s retirement to fund Gusto.
R824–25, 851, 853. Like Brewhaha, his father was not listed as an owner of
Gusto. R735. And, again like Brewhaha, Gusto failed within months. R826.
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Protective Services investigates
When Ken, David’s younger brother, learned about the eviction notice,
he was suspicious; he knew David’s retirement was more than enough to pay
Highland Cove. R605–07. So he reported his suspicions to Tower; and Tower
(and later Ken) contacted Adult Protective Services (Protective Services).
R546–47, 605–07.
When Protective Services first met David, it found that he couldn’t
remember his age, birthday, siblings’ names, where he had worked, where
he had banked, how much money he made, or how to call 911. R669. When
Protective Services asked for a phone number, David brought them a
fingernail kit. Id. When David took a phone call during the meeting, he looked
confused, and when he hung up, he could not remember who he was talking
to or what the conversation was about. R668–69, 675–77.
Jones admitted to Protective Services that he had used his father’s
retirement income but said he had his father’s blessing to use “whatever
money he wanted to.” R672. When confronted with Highland Cove’s unpaid
bills, Jones said that Highland Cove let him “get away with it”—that is, they
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had agreed to let him defer payments until Brewhaha was turning a profit—
the same stories that Jones would later peddle at trial. R671–72, 688, 818–19.
Protective Services’ investigation found that from October 2013 (when
David was admitted to Highland Cove) to October 2014 (when the Office of
Public Guardian took over as David’s guardian, see infra) David made $76,000
from his retirement income. R661–62. During that time, Jones made just four
payments to Highland Cove, totaling about $12,000. R662, SE3. Leaving more
than $60,000 that Jones spent on the restaurant or himself. R677–78, 742, 830–
33.
The Public Guardian takes over
The Office of Public Guardian (Public Guardian) took over as David’s
guardian in October 2014. R567. From there on, David’s care at Highland
Cove was paid each month and within a year it had paid in full the more than
$27,000 David owed for unpaid care. R572, 588–89. With his account current,
Ken, David’s younger brother took over as guardian. R589, 607.
Jones runs up charges on David’s credit card
As Protective Services investigated and the Public Guardian took over,
Jones spent his father’s money even faster. In mid-October, he opened a new
credit card in his father’s name. R663, 729–30, SE25–26. He then transferred
around $5,000 from an old credit card (again in his father’s name) to the new
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card and closed the old one. Id. Then, in three weeks, he spent another $14,000
on the new credit card. Id. Some of these expenses were for the restaurant,
but some were personal with charges to places like Snowbird, a dentist office,
the DMV, cable television, and gas stations. SE26. Jones later called the Public
Guardian and asked why it was not paying off this credit card. R571–72.
David fails the MoCA test
Shortly after the Public Guardian took over, David’s geriatric nurse
performed a MoCA test—the Montreal Cognitive Assessment—which is the
favored screening tool for dementia. R692, 694, 702. When she walked into
the room, David was standing, holding the phone, and listening to the dial
tone. R698–99. In the test, David couldn’t identify a lion or a rhinoceros,
repeat sentences, repeat simple one- or two-syllable words like “face” or
“church”, answer simple math questions, recognize letters in the alphabet.
R704–05. David scored zero out of a possible thirty points on the MoCA test.
R707.
Jones tries to retake control of his father’s income
When the Public Guardian took over, Jones lost access to his father’s
money. Just ten days after David failed the MoCA test, Jones drafted three
documents (Financial Control Documents), took them to David, and had him
sign them. R827–28, SE17–19. These documents directed David’s retirement
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income to be deposited into Jones’s personal accounts, authorized Jones to
manage David’s retirement accounts and to make loans to himself, and
changed the accounts’ contact information from David’s to Jones’s. SE17–19.
Each concluded by stating that David did not “recognize the authority of any
person, institution, or Agency that attempts to change these directions.” Id.
Jones admitted that the Financial Control Documents’ purpose was to
“try to keep the state and the state guardian from getting [his father’s]
money.” R844–45.
At a Protective Services’ hearing a month later, Jones testified that his
father was “cogent” when he signed these documents and “definitely has the
capacity on a day-to-day basis to make decisions about who controls his
finance [sic] and where his money goes . . . and the conduct of his life.” R672,
675–76. This directly contradicted the representations Jones made several
months earlier when he argued that David should be dismissed from the
lawsuit because of his progressive dementia. SE23.
Jones files for bankruptcy
Jones eventually filed for personal bankruptcy. R852. There Jones not
only discharged the six-figure judgment, but he also discharged any of the
“loans” he made to himself from David’s retirement income. Id.
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
The State charged Jones with exploitation of a vulnerable adult and
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, both second-degree felonies.
R319.
Pretrial motions
Before trial, Jones moved to declare the exploitation statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) unconstitutional because the words “unjust” and
“improper” were too vague. R174–84. The trial court deferred ruling on this
motion until after the trial, where it denied the motion. R950–56.
Jones also asked the court to exclude any 404(b) evidence because the
prosecution had not provided notice of such evidence despite his discovery
requests. R362–81. Specifically, Jones asked the court to exclude “evidence
that he used [his father’s] credit cards.” R366–67. Jones acknowledged that he
had received the credit card evidence but protested that he “wasn’t aware
until recently that [the prosecution] planned on introducing it as part of the
criminal event.” R368–69. The prosecution responded that the credit card
evidence was part of its case-in-chief, not 404(b) evidence. R369–71.
The court ruled that any evidence that “is relevant to what’s charged
in the information” would be admissible. R375. But if it was “evidence of
other bad acts outside of the scope of what’s charged in the information, then
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[it would] hear an argument that it’s not admissible because [the prosecution]
didn’t give the 404(b) notice.” Id.
Motion for a Directed Verdict
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Jones moved for a directed
verdict for insufficient evidence. R753. When asked if he “want[ed] to make
an argument” on that point, Jones declined, and the trial court denied it. Id.
Disposition and appeal
The jury convicted Jones of one count each of unlawful dealing of
property by a fiduciary and exploitation of a vulnerable adult, both seconddegree felonies. R252–53. The court sentenced Jones to 1-to-15 years in prison
on each count and ordered them to run concurrently. R325. It then suspended
the prison term, sentenced Jones to 180 days in jail for his exploitation charge
and placed him on AP&P-supervised probation for 36 months. Id.
Jones now appeals. R328.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point 1.A: Two witnesses testified that David lacked capacity to read
or understand complicated financial documents. According to Jones, these
were “expert” opinions and his counsel should have objected. But these
testimonies were based on the witnesses’ personal observations of David and
reasonable counsel could conclude that they were lay opinions or that any
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objection to their qualifications would have been unlikely to succeed (as both
witnesses had advanced degrees and extensive experience in working with
cognitively-impaired adults). In any event, the evidence of David’s incapacity
was overwhelming, so there is no reasonable probability of a different
outcome even if these “expert” opinions had been excluded.
Point I.B: In discovery, the prosecution did not give notice of 404(b)
that it intended to offer 404(b) evidence. At trial, it introduced a lease
agreement for one of Jones’s restaurants and a document showing several
loans made to Jones. Jones says that these documents are 404(b) evidence and
his counsel should have objected on lack-of-notice grounds. But reasonable
counsel could conclude that the documents were not proof of a “crime,
wrong, or other act,” or were intrinsic to Jones’s charged crimes, and thus not
subject to 404(b) and its notice provisions. Reasonable counsel could also
conclude that these documents supported his defense that his father had
loaned him money before his progressive dementia and wanted to see the
restaurant succeed. In any event, neither document prejudiced Jones as both
helped his defense and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.
Point I.C: According to Jones, the unlawful dealing statute requires a
knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss element and his counsel
was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. But reasonable counsel
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could conclude that the knowing mental state applied only to the violationof-duty element, not the substantial-risk-of-loss element. Jones cites no
controlling authority available to counsel that would have alerted him
otherwise. In any event, the evidence that Jones knew his actions involved a
substantial risk of loss was overwhelming. So there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different with Jones’s
requested instruction.
Point I.D: Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not asking to
merge his exploitation of a vulnerable adult count with his unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary count because the two crimes are lesser-included
offenses of each other. But exploitation requires an element not found in
unlawful dealing: a vulnerable adult. And unlawful dealing requires an
element not found in exploitation: a fiduciary.
Point II: Jones says that the terms “unjust[]” and “improper[]” in the
exploitation statute are unconstitutionally vague. But any person of ordinary
intelligence would understand that taking all your 90-year-old, demented,
father’s income (roughly $6,500 a month, including $900/month from his
father’s long-term care insurance policy) to pay for your living expenses and
failed restaurants, while refusing to pay your father’s rent, care,
prescriptions, or basic personal needs is unjust and improper and thus
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proscribed by the statue. So the statute, as applied to Jones, is not vague and
he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of it as applied to the
hypothetical conduct of others.
Point III: Jones argues that there is insufficient evidence of intent. But
this issue fails for procedural reasons: it is not preserved, and Jones fails to
argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. It also fails on its merits.
At best, Jones shows a dispute in the evidence. But disputed evidence does
not equal insufficient evidence; that is especially true when the evidence on
the guilty side of the dispute is overwhelming, as it is here.

ARGUMENT
I.
Jones’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective.
Jones alleges that his counsel was ineffective because he: (1) did not
object to unnoticed testimony that he says was expert testimony; (2) did not
object to unnoticed evidence that he says was 404(b) evidence; (3) stipulated
to a jury instruction that tracked the statutory language; and (4) did not ask
to merge Jones’s convictions, each of which included an element that the
other did not.2 Jones also alleges cumulative error.

Jones’s first three ineffectiveness claims are found in section I of his
brief; his fourth is found in section IV. For ease of reference, all four of his
ineffectiveness claims are joined in a single section.
2
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Claims of ineffective assistance place a “heavy burden” on appellants
like Jones. State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶25, 262 P.3d 1. To prevail, he must
prove both (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that he
was prejudiced by it. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984).
Establishing deficient performance requires proof that no reasonable
attorney would have done what counsel did. Id. at 687–88. To “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight,” reasonableness is evaluated from “counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. It is also viewed under “prevailing
professional norms,” rather than “best practices” or “common custom.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (cleaned up. And it is reviewed
in light of the controlling law available to counsel. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential
because unlike the reviewing court, counsel “observed the relevant
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.” Id. So there are “countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case” and even “the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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These principles distill to this: a defendant claiming deficient
performance must prove that “no competent attorney” would have
proceeded as his counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011).
Establishing prejudice requires the defendant to show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A
reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (cleaned up).
Rather, “[c]ounsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. (cleaned up). Proof of prejudice
must be based on a “demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter.” State
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up)).
Here, Jones fails to prove either required element for each of his four
ineffective assistance claims. The failure to prove one is fatal.
A. Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to Tower’s or
Mack’s “expert” opinions.
Based on their personal observations, Cody Tower (Highland Cove’s
general manager) and Kimberly Mack (an investigator with Protective
Services) opined that Jones’s 93-year-old demented father, based on their
personal observations, was incapable of understanding complicated financial

-23-

documents. According to Jones, these are expert opinions and his counsel
should have objected to them because (1) the prosecution did not give experttestimony notice as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (West 2018)
and (2) the prosecution had neither (a) qualified them as experts nor (b)
established the reliability of their opinions. Aplt.Brf.15–21.
This claim fails for several reasons. First, Tower’s and Mack’s opinions
were no so clearly expert testimony that all competent counsel would have
recognized it as such. Second, even if they would have, reasonable counsel
could conclude that Tower and Mack were qualified and any objection would
have been futile. And, as far as the notice objection, it would have resulted
only in a continuance and reasonable counsel could conclude a continuance
was unnecessary. Finally, even if all competent counsel would have objected,
Jones cannot prove prejudice where Tower’s and Mack’s testimonies were
cumulative of much stronger evidence of David’s poor mental state.
1. Reasonable counsel could conclude that Tower and Mack
gave lay opinions, not expert ones.
The test for determining if Tower’s or Mack’s opinions are lay or expert
is “whether [their] testimony require[d] [them to] have scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34,
147 P.3d 1176. Stated another way, if “an average bystander would be able to
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provide [their] same testimony,” then it is lay opinion testimony and the State
was not required to provide notice or qualify them as experts. Id. ¶34.
But the question is not simply whether Tower’s or Mack’s opinions are
lay or expert. Jones’s claim is one for ineffective assistance. So the focus is not
on the merits of the objection. Rather, the issue is whether Tower’s and
Mack’s opinions were so clearly expert opinions that all competent defense
attorneys would have recognized it as such. Here, the answer here is no. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.3
a. Tower’s testimony.
Tower saw David every day from the time he was admitted to
Highland Cove. R533–34. Tower testified that David struggled to
communicate with others (as an example, on David’s first day at the facility
he could not communicate that he had lost his wallet); could not understand
most questions beyond basic pleasantries like “hello[]” or “how are you”; was

Jones tries to change the question. He says deficient performance is
about strategy, not reasonableness. Aplt.Brf.18. According to him, if there
was no reasonable strategy behind failing to object, then his counsel’s
performance is deficient. Id. This formulation of deficient performance has
some support in Utah case law. See State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶37
n.7, 414 P.3d 559. But the United States Supreme Court has rejected it: “The
relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they
were reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (emphasis
added).
3
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unable to take care of his day-to-day needs like food, clothing, and grooming
without prompts or cues from others; and could not make his own decisions
without “direction from other people.” R533–34, 536, 538, 557, 559.
After David had been at Highland Cove for three weeks, Jones had
David sign the Loan Document authorizing Jones to “borrow funds, on a
periodic basis,” with “no limit,” from any or all of [David’s] retirement
accounts . . . for business or personal use as [Jones] deems necessary.” SE16.
None of this, of course, is opinion testimony at all, only observations of
someone experienced in dealing with cognitively-impaired adults.
The State asked Tower, based on his interactions, if David could read
and comprehend the Loan Document. R539.4 Tower opined, “[A]s I know
David and the complexity of what is written [in the Loan Document], I would
say that it would be very difficult for him to understand what . . . he would
be signing.” Id.

The State’s question was as follows: “Based upon your psychiatry
degree, based upon your daily interaction with David O. Jones, do you have
an opinion whether or not he could read this document and comprehend it?”
R539. Tower’s degree was in psychology, not psychiatry. R532. And though
the question asked David to use his psychology training, it does not change
the fact that his testimony was based on his personal observations, not his
psychology training, and that reasonable counsel could conclude that any lay
person who had interacted with David could have provided the same
testimony.
4
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This is lay opinion testimony. An average bystander, with no scientific,
technical, or other specialized training, could opine that a 90-year-old man,
with progressive dementia—who cannot answer questions beyond “how are
you,” who cannot take care of his day-to-day needs, or make decisions on his
own—would have difficulty understanding a complex financial document.
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34. At a minimum, Tower’s testimony is not
so clearly expert testimony that all competent defense attorneys would have
recognized it as such.
b. Mack’s testimony.
Mack’s testimony is similar. Mack visited David roughly ten months
after he signed the Loan Document. In this visit, David couldn’t remember
his age, birthday, how to call 911, what military branch he served in, where
he banked, or his siblings’ names. R669. When Mack asked David for Jones’s
phone number, he went to the counter, picked up a fingernail kit, and gave it
to Mack. R669.
Based on these observations, Mack opined that: (1) David had
“significant memory impairment,” (2) ten months earlier David did not have
capacity to sign the Loan Document, and (3) four months later David did not
have capacity to sign the Financial Control Documents. R668, 678–79, 682–83,
SE17–19.
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An average bystander, with no scientific, technical, or other specialized
training, could opine that a 90-year-old man, with progressive dementia—
who does not remember his age, how to call 911, or his siblings’ names, and
brings a fingernail kit when asked for a phone number—has memory
impairment and

is incapable of understanding complex financial

documents.5 At a minimum, Mack’s testimony is not so clearly expert that all
competent defense attorneys would have recognized it as such.
2. Reasonable counsel could conclude that an objection
would have been futile.
Tower had a bachelor’s degree in psychology, a master’s in counseling
and psychology, and almost twenty years’ experience in working with
elderly persons. R532–33. So reasonable counsel could conclude that an

Jones argues that Mack’s testimony about David’s capacity to sign
the Loan and Financial Control Documents could not qualify as lay testimony
because it was not “rationally based on [Mack’s] perception.” Aplt.Brf.17–18.
That is, because Mack did not see Jones at or near the time that he signed the
documents she could not testify to his mental state on those occasions
without offering expert testimony. Id. Jones may have a point on the Loan
Document, which was signed 10 months before Mack first met David. But
there was already plenty of evidence, including Jones’s admission, that David
lacked capacity to sign that document.
5

He has no such point on the Financial Control Documents. True, Mack
saw David four months before he signed the Financial Control Documents.
Yet, at that point, it was already clear that David lacked capacity to sign. As
David was suffering from progressive dementia, his mental capacity would
have only been worse—not better—four months down the line.
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objection would have been futile (as Tower was qualified); or worse, it may
have resulted in the prosecution chronicling Tower’s experience in front of
the jury, which would have increased the persuasiveness of his testimony.
The same is true of Mack. Mack had a bachelor’s degree in gerontology
and master’s in social work. R666. She had worked for Adult Protective
Services for seven years where she had conducted nearly a thousand
evaluations of cognitively-impaired adults and was trained to do cognitive
testing and capacity assessments. R666–67, 687. Again, reasonable counsel
could conclude that an objection would have been futile (as Mack was
qualified); or worse, it may have resulted in the prosecution chronicling
Mack’s experience in front of the jury, which would have increased the
persuasiveness of her testimony.6

Jones suggests that his counsel may have been deficient for not
investigating Mack’s qualifications. Aplt.Brf.18–19 (stating counsel “was not
in a position to weigh the relative risks of objecting against the need to object
without at least investigating whether [Mack] was qualified . . . .”). But there
is no record evidence that counsel had not investigated Mack’s qualifications.
Indeed, the record shows the opposite. Jones’s counsel knew that Mack did
not have degrees in psychology or psychiatry, knew that she did not do a
cognitive test on David, and was prepared to highlight issues with her
testimony such as the timing of when she visited David. R86–88.
6
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3. Jones has not proved that all competent counsel would
have tried to exclude the testimony on lack-of-notice
grounds.
Even if counsel could have shown that Tower’s and Mack’s testimony
was expert testimony, the trial court could have excluded it for lack of notice
only if it found that the State deliberately withheld notice in “bad faith.” Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Jones has not alleged, let alone proven, that that was
so.
On the record, then, counsel could have at most secured a continuance
on lack-of-notice grounds; but again, only if he could show that Tower’s and
Mack’s testimony was expert testimony. Id. But Jones has not shown that all
competent counsel would have asked for a continuance or even concluded
that one was desirable. Counsel knew Mack and Tower would testify, knew
their qualifications, had prepared for both, and countered their testimony on
cross-examination and with other witnesses. Not only that, but Jones offers
nothing to suggest that there was a reasonable probability that a continuance
would have changed the outcome of his trial.
4. There is no prejudice because the “expert” testimonies
were merely cumulative of David’s poor mental capacity.
Jones says that Tower’s and Mack’s “expert” opinions were prejudicial
because they bolstered the prosecution’s case that David lacked capacity.
Aplt.Brf.20–21. But showing that evidence may have bolstered a fact does not
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answer Strickland’s prejudice inquiry: whether there is a reasonable
probability that without Tower’s and Mack’s opinions the result of would
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see State
v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶44, 248 P.3d 984 (noting that even if testimony
results in improper bolstering there is no reversal “unless it was prejudicial”).
Here, given the overwhelming evidence of David’s incapacity, there is no
such probability.
First, Jones admitted his father lacked capacity to sign the Loan and
Financial Control Documents. According to Jones, his father started showing
signs of dementia in 2010. R808. Three years later, but before Jones got David
to sign either document, Jones admitted that his father was “incompetent”;
and lacked capacity to sign things like a lease or a personal guarantee. R835–
36, 838, 840, SE23. When he checked his father into Highland Cove, Jones
again repeated that his father was “arguabl[y] . . . incompetent” at that time.
R808. These admissions are enough to dispel any notions of prejudice. But
there is more.
Multiple lay witnesses described David’s incapacity long before he
signed the Loan Document.
▪ Eight years before signing the Loan Document, David could not
recognize his brother, was noticeably disoriented, and “wasn’t entirely
with it.” R600.
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▪ A couple of months before signing the Loan Document, David became
disoriented and could no longer live on his own. R695, 812.
▪ Three weeks before signing the Loan Document, Jones admitted his
father to Highland Cove, stating his father suffered from “progressive
dementia.” R516, 536, SE1.
▪ When the Loan Document was signed, David could not express
himself in words, answer basic questions, or engage in meaningful
conversations; he could not make his own food, bathe himself, or dress
himself. R536–38, 557.
Over a year later, when David signed the Financial Control Document, his
condition was worse:
▪ David could not remember the date or year. R696.
▪ When asked, “How are you today?” R697. David laughed and said, “I
don’t remember.” Id. When asked, “What are you going to do for fun
today?”; he couldn’t answer. Id.
▪ David could give only two- to four-word answers to questions. R699.
▪ David couldn’t remember his age, birthday, where he had worked or
banked, his income, his siblings’ names, or how to call 911. R669.
▪ Immediately after talking on the phone, David could not remember
who he had talked to or what he talked about. R669, 675–77.
▪ He would hold the phone, listen to the dial tone, and appear confused.
R698–99.
▪ When asked for a phone number, David brought a fingernail kit. R669.
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▪ David couldn’t draw a clock, tell time, identify a lion or a rhinoceros,
repeat sentences or even simple one- or two-syllable words like “face”
or “church,” answer basic math questions, or recognize letters from the
alphabet. R703–05.
The prosecution’s actual expert, Perrine Anderson (David’s geriatric
nurse practitioner), started visiting David about four months after he signed
the Loan Document and had visited him at least 25 times since. R697. During
a visit that was one month before David signed the Financial Control
Documents, Anderson gave David a MoCA test, which is the preferred
screening tool for dementia. R702. David received the lowest possible score
on the test, 0 out of 30 points. R707. On his best day, during all 25 visits,
Anderson opined that David may have scored 2 or 3 points. R722. Anderson
further opined that David would not have been able to read, much less
understand, the Financial Control Documents and if you had come back into
the room ten minutes after he had signed them, he would not remember it.
R697–99, 701, 721–22.
****
In sum, Jones may be right: Tower’s and Mack’s testimonies may have
bolstered the prosecution’s case to a small degree. That is, they may have
added a piece to the already overwhelming evidence of David’s incapacity.
But that doesn’t prove prejudice. It’s not enough for Jones to say that their
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testimonies added something to the evidence. Rather, Jones must show that
subtracting their testimonies, there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have doubted David’s incapacity. Jones doesn’t—and can’t—do that
here.
B. Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting alleged 404(b)
evidence.
Jones complains that his counsel should have objected to: (1) a onepage, handwritten document showing loans made to Jones from 1998–2000—
more than ten years before David’s dementia set in, and (2) the Brewhaha
lease agreement, signed by Jones and David. Aplt.Brf.22–23. According to
him, these were 404(b) evidence. Id. And because trial counsel did not receive
notice of them as was requested and required for actual 404(b) evidence, his
counsel should have objected. Id.
Jones has not proved that all competent counsel would have thought
that this was 404(b) evidence, or would have objected either way. And he has
not proved a reasonable probability that excluding the evidence would have
made a more favorable result reasonably likely.
1. The loan evidence did not prejudice Jones and reasonable
counsel could chose not to object.
The prosecution introduced a one-page, handwritten document
showing that someone had loaned Jones $64,300 from 1998 to 2000. SE20. The
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prosecution asked an investigator just two questions about this document
(confirming that the document showed loans to Jones and that there was no
indication that interest had been paid) during the two-day, thirteen-witness
trial. R685. There was no discussion of who made the loans, what they were
for, or whether they were paid. It was not discussed again in closing or
elsewhere.
Where “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice,” as it is here, the Court should do so without
reaching the deficient performance question. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Jones makes no effort to show how this loan evidence prejudiced him.
Instead, his prejudice argument focuses on the Brewhaha lease. Aplt.Brf.26–
28. Nowhere does he prove what Strickland prejudice requires: a reasonable
probability that without the loan evidence the outcome of his trial would
have been different. 466 U.S. at 694.
And Jones couldn’t prove prejudice even if he had tried. Yes, if we
assume that the loans were never repaid—because it is unclear if they were—
then the document could show that Jones had a habit of not paying his loans.
But this case is not about unpaid loans. It is about Jones’s abuse of his
fiduciary power and his exploitation of father. And the evidence on these
points was overwhelming. See subsection I.A.4, supra and section III, infra.
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Moreover, the loan evidence may have helped Jones. If these were
loans from his father, as Jones says (Aplt.Brf.24 n.10), then it was at least some
circumstantial evidence supporting his story that his father wanted to invest
in Brewhaha, which was Jones’s defense. R509, 886–87, 889. It showed that
almost ten years before any dementia or mental illness clouded his judgment,
David loaned him nearly $65,000, which could have been seen as some
support for his claim that David wanted to loan him the nearly $80,000 that
he took for his restaurants.
Jones has not proved how, in light of all the overwhelming evidence,
this record of unpaid loans from ten years earlier was enough to tip the scales
against him.
Jones also cannot show deficient performance. He says that there was
no “sound trial strategy” for not objecting. Aplt.Brf.25. But “sound trial
strategy” is not the standard for deficient performance. See Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 (2009); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,
481 (2000). The question for deficient performance “is not whether counsel’s
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 481. Jones must show that all competent counsel would have objected
to the loan evidence. But as shown, the loan evidence could reasonably be
considered supportive of the defense. A competent attorney may choose not
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to object to evidence that could be seen as helpful. In any event, Jones has not
shown that it was so clearly damaging to the defense that no competent
counsel would have let it be admitted unchallenged.
2. Reasonable counsel could conclude that rule 404(b) did not
apply to the Brewhaha lease. In any event, the Brewhaha
lease did not prejudice Jones.
Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
Brewhaha lease that he and David signed. Aplt.Brf.25–26. According to him,
the lease was 404(b) evidence. Id. And because he never received notice of it
as he had requested, he says that his counsel should have objected on lackof-notice grounds and there was no “reasonable trial strategy” for not doing
so. Id.
Again, the question for deficient performance “is not whether counsel’s
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 481.
Here, reasonable counsel could conclude that the lease agreement was
not 404(b) evidence. The Brewhaha lease, by itself, was not evidence of a
“crime, wrong, or other act” that was used “to prove [Jones’s] character,” or
anyone’s character. Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). It’s only Jones’s later, in-court
representation that he knew his father was “not competent” at the time he
signed the Brewhaha lease that makes having his father sign the lease a bad
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act. SE23. But Jones’s in-court representation of his father’s incompetency was
admissible irrespective of whether the lease’s admissibility. And as such, the
lease, as the physical document that his father signed was going to be
admissible too.
Further, because getting his father to sign the Brewhaha lease when his
father was incompetent to do so is integral, that is “intrinsic,” to Jones’s
crimes, it is not evidence of another crime used to prove his general criminal
character. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶14 n.7 (cleaned up) (noting that if
challenged evidence is “inextricably intertwined with the crime that is
charged,” or “if both the crime charged and the prior act are considered part
of a single criminal episode,” then rule 404(b) and its notice provisions do not
apply); see United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir. 1993); State
v. Burke, 2011 UT App 186, ¶¶65–66, 256 P.3d 1102. It’s evidence of this crime.
At least counsel could reasonably so conclude.
Reasonable counsel could also choose not to object because, like the
loan evidence, the Brewhaha lease could be considered supportive of the
defense theory. It showed that his father, before admission to Highland Cove,
signed the lease both as a tenant and as personal guarantor. This offered some
support for Jones’s narrative that his father was his partner, wanted
Brewhaha to succeed, and wanted to invest his money in it.
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For this reason, and others, there was no prejudice. The lease, by itself,
did nothing to help the prosecution. What helped the prosecution was Jones’s
admission in a later court filing that he knew his father was “not competent”
when he signed the lease. SE23.7 But even if the lease had never been
introduced, Jones’s admission would have been. It was his non-hearsay
statement admitting that his father was “not competent” when he signed the
lease that proved a central issue: David’s vulnerability and his incompetency
to give his son money. The lease itself was not damning.
C. Reasonable counsel could conclude that the substantial-riskof-loss element required only a reckless mental state.
The trial court, consistent with the statute, instructed the jury that to
convict Jones of unlawful dealing, it had to find:
1. That [Jones];
2. Acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect to each
and every one of the following elements;
3. Dealt with property that had been entrusted to him as a fiduciary,
in a manner in which the [Jones] knew (beyond just recklessness) was
a violation of the [Jones]’s duty;

Most of Jones’s prejudice argument focuses on his admission that he
knew his father was incompetent. Again, that’s separate from the lease, is not
404(b) evidence, and was always going to be admitted. So Jones cannot use it
to argue prejudice.
7
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4. Which involved a substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted; and
5. The total value of the property is equal to or exceeds $5,000.
On the unlawful dealing charge, the jury was instructed as follows:
R238. Jones says his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to this instruction
because the unlawful dealing statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2018))
requires at least a knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss
element (the fourth element). Aplt.Brf.29–30.
Because this is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the question
is not whether the unlawful dealing statute could be interpreted to require a
knowing mental state for the substantial risk-of-loss element. That is a
statutory argument that Jones did not make below and is thus unpreserved.
Instead, the question for ineffective assistance of counsel is this: Did the
unlawful dealing statute so clearly require a knowing mental state for the
substantial-risk-of-loss element that all competent defense attorneys would
have requested it? The answer is no.
Reasonable counsel could conclude that the knowing mental state did
not apply to the substantial-risk-of-loss element. The unlawful dealing statute
reads:
A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with the property by a
fiduciary if the person deals with property that has been entrusted to
him as a fiduciary . . . in a manner in which the person knows is a
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violation of the person’s duty and which involves substantial risk of
loss or detriment to the owner . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513. The knowing mental state clearly applies to the
violation-of-duty element, and the jury was so instructed. R238. But the
statutory language does not clearly extend the knowing mental state to the
substantial-risk-of-loss element. With no guidance from any appellate court
or the legislature, reasonable counsel could conclude that the default
intentional, knowing, or reckless mental state applied to the substantial-riskof-loss element. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West 2018). And because that
conclusion would be a reasonable one, counsel reasonably agreed to the jury
being instructed in that language.
Jones has not demonstrated otherwise. He relies on extra-jurisdictional
statutes and cases to support his argument that the substantial-risk-of-loss
element also requires a “knowing” mental state. But counsel is not charged
with knowing and arguing extra-jurisdictional authority. Instead, Jones must
“demonstrate that [Utah] law at the time of his trial entitled him” to an
instruction that the substantial-risk-of-loss element required a knowing
mental state and that all reasonable counsel would have requested such an
instruction.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). He fails to do so.
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In any event, Jones cannot prove prejudice. The evidence that he knew
his actions involved of a substantial risk of loss or detriment to his father was
overwhelming. See subsection III.B. infra.
And the jury found that Jones acted knowingly. In its special verdict
form the jury found that Jones acted intentionally or knowingly with respect
to all the elements of the exploitation of a vulnerable adult charge. R237, 253.
So it necessarily found that Jones knowingly used at least $5,000 of his father’s
resources for Jones’s own profit. And if Jones knowingly used his father’s
resources for his own profit, he knew that his actions involved a substantial
risk of loss. So there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have
found that Jones’s actions were merely reckless as opposed to knowing.
D. Jones’s convictions are not lesser-included offenses.
Jones’s argument that his counsel should have moved to merge his two
convictions rests on his assumption that the unlawful dealing count is
necessarily included in the exploitation count (or vice versa).8 It’s not.
Utah’s merger statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2018))
“contains two merger tests.” State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶22, n.6, 420 P.3d

Jones never spells out which count he believes is the lesser and which
is the greater. However, as detailed below, neither is a lesser-included of the
other.
8
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1064. The same criminal act test found in subsection (1) and the lesserincluded offense test found in subsection (3). Id.
Jones “makes no argument and provides no reasoned analysis
concerning the applicability of subsection (1).” State v. Corona, 2018 UT App
154, ¶45, --- P.3d ---. He “does not address the question of whether his
[unlawful dealing and exploitation counts] constitute a single offense, but
instead only ‘compares the statutory elements of each offense’ and attempts
to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists.” Id.; see Aplt.Brf.48–
53. “Accordingly, under subsection (1), [Jones] has failed to demonstrate that
his claim is meritorious and has therefore failed to show that his counsel was
ineffective” for not moving to merge the two counts based on the same
criminal act test. Id.9
So the only question Jones presents is whether his counsel was
ineffective for not moving to merge one of his two crimes into the other as a
lesser-included offense.

Jones cites subsection (1)’s same criminal act language. Aplt.Brf.48.
But then lays out the test for lesser-included offenses and analyzes his claim
thereunder. Id. at 49.
9

Even if he had made the same criminal act argument, his claim would
fail. His two convictions required separate acts. For unlawful dealing, he had
to be his father’s fiduciary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513; R238. For exploitation
of a vulnerable adult, he had to take advantage of his father’s vulnerable
condition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111; R237. Those acts are not the same.
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An offense is an included offense, and merges with the greater, when
“[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish commission of the offense charged.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3)(a) (emphasis added). “To be necessarily included in the greater
offense, the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the
greater without first having committed the lesser.” Schmuck v. United States,
489 U.S. 705, 719 (1989) (cleaned up); see State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,
¶10, 71 P.3d 624. Thus, if “the lesser offense requires an element not required
for the greater offense,” it is not a lesser included offense. Schmuck, 489 U.S.
at 716; see Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10.
The question of whether a lesser-greater relationship exists “turns on
the statutorily defined elements of the two crimes.” Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
¶16 overruled in part by State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶33, --- P.3d ---. While
courts may look “to the facts to determine what crime, or variation of the
crime, was proved . . . once this determination is made, the court looks [only]
to [its] statutory elements.” Id. In other words, “the focus” of any lesserincluded-offense analysis “is on the [crime’s] statutory elements” not the facts
used to prove those elements. State v. Meacham, 2000 UT App 247, ¶29, 9 P.3d
777.
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Here, unlawful dealing requires that Jones be a fiduciary; there is no
such requirement for exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2018) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 (West 2018); see
also R237–38 (providing the jury instructions in this case).10 Similarly,
exploitation of a vulnerable adult requires a vulnerable adult; there is no such
requirement for unlawful dealing. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 with
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513; see also R237–38. Because Jones could commit
each crime without necessarily committing the other, they are not lesserincluded offenses. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716; Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10.
And as such, any merger motion would have been futile; Jones’s counsel
cannot be ineffective for not making a futile motion. State v. Heywood, 2015
UT App 191, ¶48, 357 P.3d 565 (citing State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d
546).
E. Jones has shown no error, let alone cumulative error
Jones finally asks this Court to reverse based on cumulative error, if
nothing else. But because he has not shown any error, he necessarily cannot

True, some variations of exploitation of a vulnerable adult may
include a fiduciary element. For example, one variation requires that the
defendant be in a “position of trust,” which includes a fiduciary. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(i). Another variation requires that the defendant “use[]
a vulnerable adult’s power of attorney or guardianship” for the profit of
someone other than a vulnerable adult. Id. § 76-5-11(4)(a)(iv). But neither of
those variations were charged here, nor was the jury instructed on them.
10
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show cumulative error. See State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶¶39–40,
872 Utah Adv. Rep. 51.
II.
Jones lacks standing to challenge the exploitation of a
vulnerable adult statute because it is not vague as
applied to his conduct.
A person is guilty of second-degree exploitation of a vulnerable adult
if, acting with intent or knowledge, he or she “unjustly or improperly uses or
manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of
someone other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111
(4)(a)(iii) (West 2018). According to Jones, the terms “unjust” and “improper”
are unconstitutionally vague because they are subjective and “could lead to
charges against virtually anyone who uses a vulnerable adult’s resources for
the use of anyone other than the vulnerable adult.” Aplt.Brf.38–45.
The vagueness doctrine “is an outgrowth . . . of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
Some vagueness is inherent in language—“[c]ondemned to the use of words,
we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). So the Constitution “does not require
impossible standards” and the elimination of any possible vagueness. United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). A statute is only unconstitutionally vague
because it either “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
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opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits,” or “it authorizes or
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶43, 99 P.3d 820.
It is well-established that a defendant “who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others.” Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
So a court should “examine the [defendant’s] conduct before analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law.” Id. If the defendant’s conduct is clearly
prohibited, then he lacks standing to challenge the statute based on another’s
hypothetical conduct. State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶44, 100 P.3d 231;
State v. Jones, 2018 UT App 110, ¶16, 427 P.3d 538.
Here, Jones lacks standing because his conduct is clearly prohibited.
Jones, acting intentionally or knowingly (R237, 253), took his 90-year-old,
demented father’s retirement income (whom Jones admitted was
“incompetent” at this point) —including $900/month from his father’s longterm care policy—to pay for Jones’s living expenses and his two failed
restaurants, while refusing to pay for his father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or
personal needs such as a haircut or bed pads. Any person of ordinary
intelligence, “would have had to have known that wherever the precise
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boundary between [just] and [unjust use of his father’s resources] might lie,”
his conduct clearly fell on the side of unjust and improper. State v. Tulley, 2018
UT 35, ¶69, 428 P.3d 1005.11
Jones ignores his conduct. He uses nearly all his vagueness argument
(10 of 11 paragraphs) to explore the hypothetical conduct of others or
decisions from other jurisdictions. Aplt.Brf.38–45. In his final, two-sentence
paragraph, he concludes—with no analysis—that the exploitation statute is
vague as applied to him because “he was not put on notice as to any lay
activity what [sic] conduct constituted improper or unjust management of
[his father’s] resources.” Aplt.Brf.44–45. But an as-applied challenge is not
concerned with what general conduct is unjust or improper, it is about
whether Jones’s specific conduct was. Here, by any definition, Jones’s conduct

Not only that, but Jones’s conduct clearly violated other more specific
provisions of the exploitation statute that Jones does not assail as vague
(although he was not charged under these variations). For example, under
subsection 4(a)(ii) Jones was guilty of second-degree felony exploitation if,
acting intentionally or knowingly, he “[knew] or should know[n] that the
vulnerable adult lack[ed] capacity to consent, and obtain[ed] or use[d] . . . the
vulnerable adult’s funds, assets, or property with intent to temporarily or
permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, benefit, or possession of
his property, for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult.”
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(ii). Jones said his father was incompetent well
before he started taking his money—so Jones knew or should have known
his father lacked capacity to consent to his use of all his father’s resources for
Jones’s own personal gain.
11
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was unjust and improper. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶69. And because it is, Jones
has no standing to mount a facial challenge to the exploitation statute. Ansari,
2004 UT App 326, ¶44; see Jones, 2018 UT App 110, ¶17.
In any event, persons of ordinary intelligence are on notice of what is
“unjust” or “improper” when they read the exploitation statute as a whole.
When interpreting a statute, this Court’s objective is “to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.”
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). In discerning that intent,
the Court looks first to the statute’s plain language—with a presumption that
“the legislature chose its words carefully, using each term advisedly” and
“according to its ordinary meaning.” State v. LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, ¶26, 337 P.3d
254. “The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute
or with other statutes under the same or related chapters.” State v. MacGuire,
2004 UT 4, ¶15, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Utah 2004) (cleaned up).
Here, the terms “unjust” and “improper” do not appear in isolation.
The exploitation statute lists five variations of the crime. The first prohibits
employing deception or intimidation to obtain or use a vulnerable adult’s
resources for someone other than the vulnerable adult. Utah Code Ann. § 765-111(4)(i). The second makes it a crime to use a vulnerable adult’s resources
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for someone other than the vulnerable adult when the vulnerable adult lacks
the capacity to consent. Id. § 76-5-111(4)(ii). The third—the subsection under
which Jones was charged—makes it a crime to “unjustly” or “improperly”
use a vulnerable adult’s resources for the profit of someone other than the
vulnerable adult. Id. § 76-5-111(4)(iii). The fourth makes it a crime for a power
of attorney or guardian to “unjustly” or “improperly” use the vulnerable
adult’s resources for the profit of someone other than the vulnerable adult.
Id. § 76-5-111(4)(iv). And the fifth makes it a crime to “involve a vulnerable
adult who lacks the capacity to consent in the facilitation” of a crime. Id. § 765-111(4)(v).
Read as a whole, the legislature clearly sought to prohibit a particular
type of conduct: use of a vulnerable adult’s resources, without proper consent
or authorization, for the profit of someone other than the vulnerable adult. Id.
§ 76-5-111(4). So the terms “unjust” and “improper,” in context, relate to
whether the vulnerable adult consented or authorized the use of his resources
or if the defendant used deceit, intimidation, undue influence, persuasion, or
other means to obtain it.
Jones clearly understood this. His argument below was that his actions
were not unjust or improper because his father consented to them and did so
when he was still capable of consent. That is, he knew that if his father did
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not consent, or lacked capacity to do so, his actions were unjust or improper.
And his consent defense shows that he clearly knew what he needed to
address to avoid a conviction.
The plain meaning of the terms “unjust” and “improper” are also not
difficult for ordinary people to understand or apply. “Unjust” simply means,
“Contrary to justice, not fair or reasonable.” Unjust, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). Exploitation itself is defined is defined in reference to “unjust”
actions. Exploitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“exploitation” as “taking unjust advantage of another for one’s own benefit
or selfish ends” (emphasis added)). And “Improper” means, “Incorrect,
unsuitable or irregular; Fraudulent or otherwise wrongful.” Improper, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
No ordinary person would think it unjust or improper (that is, unfair,
unreasonable, fraudulent, or wrongful) for a child to ask a vulnerable parent
for help paying college tuition or buying a home. Aplt.Brf.41. But an ordinary
person would find it unjust or improper, (that is, unfair, unreasonable,
fraudulent, or wrongful) for a child to ask, knowing the vulnerable parent
lacked capacity to consent, or using intimidation or deceit to obtain their
consent, or persuading, pushing, manipulating, or using other means to take
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the money or obtain the “consent.” This is not nearly as complicated as Jones
tries to make it.
Moreover, the statute is not one of strict liability, as Jones suggests.
Aplt.Brf.40 (arguing that the statute “could lead to charges against virtually
anyone who uses a vulnerable adult’s resources for the use of anyone other
than the vulnerable adult.”). It requires Jones, or any other defendant, to act
intentionally or knowingly for felony exploitation. That is, Jones had to at
least know that his father was a vulnerable adult. He had to at least know
that his actions were unjust or improper. And he had to know that he was
using his father’s resources for his own profit. It wasn’t enough that he acted
negligently or recklessly.12 As the United States’ Supreme Court, and Utah’s
supreme court, note, “scienter requirements” like the ones here, “alleviate
vagueness concerns.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007); see Due
South, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 UT 71, ¶46, 197 P.3d 82; State
v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1995).
None of Jones’s out-of-state cases are persuasive or even helpful. While
they use similar words (e.g., “illegal,” “improper,” and “unjust”) each is part

If he had acted with criminal negligence or recklessness, he would
have been guilty of a class B or A (respectively) misdemeanor. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(b)(iii)–(iv).
12
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of a larger statute with significant differences. Aplt.Brf.41–43. As an example,
the Mississippi statute Jones references made “the illegal or improper use of
a vulnerable person or his resources for another’s profit or advantage, with
or without the consent of the vulnerable adult” a crime. Decker v. State, 66
So.2d 654, 658 (Miss. 2011) (emphasis in original). So any use, even with
consent, could be improper. Id. It was the “with or without the consent”
language as much as the “improper use” that troubled the Mississippi
supreme court. Id. Utah does not contain the “with or without consent
language” or anything like it. Not only that, but Utah’s statute contains
multiple variations of the crime and is part of a much broader exploitation
statute.
The same problems exist with Jones’s Florida case, Cuda v. State. There,
the statute made it a crime to “improper[ly] or illegal[ly] use or manage[] the
funds, assets, property, power of attorney, or guardianship of [an] aged
person or disabled adult for profit.” 639 So.2d 22, 23 n.1. Again, unlike Utah’s,
there were no variations or descriptions of the type of prohibited acts. Id. And
the court also failed to review Cuda’s actions and whether the statute, as
applied to Cuda, was vague. Something this Court has made clear must occur
first. See supra.
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And Jones’s out-of-court cases are not unanimous. State v. Sailer, for
example, found a statute similar to Utah’s was not unconstitutionally vague.
684 A.2d 1247 (Del. 1994). There, the statute defined exploitation as the
“illegal or improper use or abuse of an infirm person, his resources or his
rights, by another person, whether for profit or other advantage.” Id. at 1249
n.1. Delaware held that this statute was not vague because, like Utah’s, the
legislature’s intent, the language of the statute, the mental-state requirement,
and the plain meaning of the terms “illegal” and “improper” “adequately
notified” defendants of what actions were unlawful. Id.
****
In sum, Jones lacks standing to raise a vagueness claim. But the statute
is not vague because it clearly prohibits Jones from taking all his 90-year-old,
demented, incompetent father’s retirement income (roughly $6,500 a month,
including $900/month from his father’s long-term care insurance policy)to
pay for Jones’s personal living expenses and his two failed restaurants, while
refusing to pay for his father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or basic personal
needs.
III.
There is sufficient evidence of Jones’s intent.
Jones says that the trial court erred when it denied his directed verdict
motion. Aplt.Brf.45–47. According to him, there was insufficient evidence
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that he knew he had “violated his fiduciary duty and that the breach involved
a substantial risk of loss,” as required by his unlawful dealing conviction. Id.
at 46. And, he says, there was insufficient evidence that he “unjustly or
improperly used or managed” his father’s resources to his own advantage, as
required by his exploitation conviction. Id.
This claim fails for a few reasons. First, it is unpreserved, and Jones
fails to adequately argue that a preservation exception applies. So this Court
should decline to review it. Second, even if preserved, there is more than
enough evidence to support both convictions.
A. This issue is unpreserved.
An issue is preserved if it is “presented to the trial court in such a way
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St. v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶51, 99 P.3d 801 (cleaned up). This requires the
issue to be both timely and specifically raised, with supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. Id.; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a) (“A motion shall
state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and
the relief sought.”).
That didn’t happen here. Jones claims that his generic directed verdict
motion preserved the issue. Aplt.Brf.3 (citing R753). At the close of the State’s
case, counsel asked for a “directed verdict for insufficiency of the evidence.”

-55-

R753. When asked if he “want[ed] to make an argument,” counsel declined,
and the court summarily denied the motion. Id. That was all.
“[A] generic motion for a directed verdict,” like Jones’s, can preserve a
specific ground for appeal only when “‘the specific ground for an objection
is clear from its context.’” State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶22, 354 P.3d 791
(quoting State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶26, 345 P.3d 1168); see State v. Doyle,
2018 UT App 239, --- P.3d ---. For example, in Gonzalez, it was clear that
Gonzalez’s generic directed verdict motion was based on the State’s alleged
failure to disprove self defense because that was Gonzalez’s “sole defense” to
the murder charge. 2015 UT 10, ¶26. And in Doyle it was clear that Doyle’s
directed verdict motion that the state had the burden to prove self defense
and that it had to “present more than it had” was enough to preserve an
argument that the self-defense evidence was inconclusive and speculative.
2018 UT App 239, ¶16.
Unlike Gonzalez or Doyle, there is no one clear ground for Jones’s
motion. Jones had two, separate charges: exploitation of a vulnerable adult
and unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary.13 Both have several elements

Gonzalez had two charges too, murder and obstruction of justice.
2015 UT 10, ¶26. But Gonzalez’s “obstruction-of-justice charge turned on his
challenge to the murder charge.” Id. So, unlike here, the obstruction charge
depended on the murder charge. Id.
13
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that Jones disputed. For example, on his exploitation charge, Jones disputed
that he acted with intent and that he unjustly or improperly used his father’s
resources. On his unlawful-dealing charge, he disputed that he knowingly
violated a duty to his father and that his actions involved a substantial risk of
loss to his father. His perfunctory motion failed to identify which of these
elements he alleges the State did not prove and fails to provide any
supportive reasoning or authority. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶16, 164 P.3d
397; State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, ¶7, 275 P.3d 1032.14
The purpose of the preservation requirement is to put the “trial judge
on notice of the asserted error and allow[ ] for [timely] correction.” 438 Main
Street, 2004 UT 72, ¶51. Jones’s motion did not call the judge’s attention to the
problem he raises here: a lack of evidence of intent. So the trial court never
had a chance to address this issue. This Court should not address it either.
Jones says, in a footnote, that this Court may nevertheless review this
claim for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt.Brf.46 n.18. But

And the seriousness of his exploitation charge varies based on his
mental state. If it was done intentionally or knowingly, it is a second-degree
felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-110(4)(b) (West 2018). If done recklessly, it is a
class A misdemeanor. Id. Jones advocated that an instruction on the lesser,
class-A offense be given to the jury. Yet his directed verdict motion fails to
state whether he believes the State failed to prove an intentional or knowing
mental state, a reckless mental state, or any mental state.
14
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while an unpreserved claim can be reviewed for plain error or ineffective
assistance, it is not enough to merely utter those words in a footnote without
providing any analysis or application of these doctrines to his specific facts.
See State v. Padilla, 2018 UT App 108, ¶19, --- P.3d ---.
B. Jones’s claim is meritless.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, this Court
does not “sit as a second fact finder.” Salt Lake City v. Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶10,
342 P.3d 212. Instead, its review “is limited to insuring that there is sufficient
competent evidence regarding each element of the charge to enable a jury to
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.”
Id. In doing so, this Court must view the “evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom . . . in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.” Id. In the end, so long as there is “some evidence” to support
each element, this Court’s sufficiency inquiry ends. Id.
Jones says that there was insufficient evidence that he knew he had
violated his fiduciary duty or that he knew was using his father’s retirement
income unjustly or improperly. Aplt.Brf.46–47. He also claims that there was
no evidence that his actions created a substantial risk of loss. Id.
But there is overwhelming evidence to support both, and far more than
his stingy recitation (see Aplt.Brf.46–47). Consider the following:
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▪ By his own admission, Jones knew his father was “not competent” no
later than 2012. R808, 837–38, SE23.
▪ A year later, Jones had his father sign a lease for Brewhaha that Jones
knew contained provisions that were “harsh” and “incredibly unfair,”
and even though the prior tenant warned Jones about the landlord.
R807, 836–37, SE23.
▪ Six months later, shortly after his father’s three-night hospital stay,
twenty-day rehabilitation, and after he was checked in to Highland
Cove for “progressive dementia,” Jones had his father sign the Loan
Document, which allowed Jones to loan himself all his father’s
retirement income. R516, 536, SE1, 16.
▪ Over the next several months, Jones “loaned” himself all his father’s
$6,500/month retirement income, including $900/month that was
from a long-term care policy specifically created to pay for his father’s
care, then used that money to pay for Brewhaha and Jones’s own
personal living expenses because Jones was unemployed. R661, 820,
824–25, 853.
▪ When Brewhaha failed, and after a six-figure judgment, Jones chose to
open another restaurant, again with his father’s retirement income, and
again without paying for his father’s care. R807, 735, 820–25, SE23
▪ Although he used his father’s retirement income for his restaurants,
and claimed his father was his partner, his father was not listed as an
owner on the business registration documents. R735.
▪ In one year, Jones took more than $60,000 from his father’s retirement
income. R742, 830–32.
▪ In that same year, Jones made just four payments to Highland Cove
totaling about $12,000, which left an unpaid balance of over $27,000.
SE3.
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▪ Jones failed to pay for his father’s personal expenses, such as a haircut
a bed pad, or his medications. R523, 543, 573, SE3.
▪ Highland Cove sent Jones monthly bills and statements requesting
payment. R519, 556, SE3.
▪ Highland Cove spoke with Jones several times each month about his
need to make payments. R522, 541–42.
▪ Highland Cove sent an eviction notice, but Jones still refused to make
payments or remove his father from Highland Cove. R543–44, SE4.
▪ Tower, Highland Cove’s manager, did not agree to let Jones miss or
defer payments.15
▪ When Jones learned that the Public Guardian was taking over his
father’s income, and he would no longer have access to it, Jones
continued to try to siphon his father’s resources by opening a new
credit card in his father’s name and, in three weeks, transferring an
almost $5,000 balance from an old card in his father’s name, ran up
$14,000 in new charges, some for the restaurant and some for his own
personal pleasure (like Snowbird or cable television), and then asked
the Public Guardian to pay for these expenses. R663, 729–30, SE25–26

Jones’s brief says that the evidence showed that “Tower did not
recall the arrangement with [Jones] to defer payments.” Aplt.Brf.46. That is
wrong. Especially where, as here, the evidence is to be viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict. When asked if he let Jones defer
payments, Tower said bluntly, “No. That would not have been my standard
procedure.” R548 (cleaned up). True, Tower did say it was possible that Jones
asked for a deferment (Tower could not remember if he had) and that he did
not recall the specifics of his conversations with Jones, but Tower reiterated
that he “would not have agreed to postponement of months of nonpayment.”
R552–53 (emphasis added).
15
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▪ Jones drafted documents to try and retake control of his father’s income
from the Public Guardian and had his father—who at this point could
not identify a lion or rhinoceros or repeat one- or two-syllable words—
sign them. SE17–19.
This evidence is overwhelming of Jones’s knowledge. When it is viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as it must be, it is much more
than “some evidence” of Jones knowledge and ends this Court’s sufficiency
inquiry. Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶10.
Jones also says that there was “no evidence that there was ever an
actual substantial risk of loss” because his father was not evicted, and
Highland Cove could not evict him. R47. Yet Jones ignores the more than
$60,000 that he “loaned” himself from his father’s retirement income, the
more than $19,000 in charges that rang up on his father’s credit card, and the
fact that he then discharged any obligation he had to repay these amounts his
personal bankruptcy.16 So not only was there a “risk of loss,” there was an
actual loss. That’s why the trial court ordered Jones to pay $75,000 in complete
restitution. Complete restitution is the amount “necessary to compensate a

This is consistent with Jones’s unwillingness below to accept any
responsibility for his actions. For sentencing, he said that he was “grateful
that through all of this [his] father had suffered no harm and no loss.” R978,
R1003, 1011. The court responded, “Your father suffered a loss in terms of the
money that you diverted away from him. . . . He is the victim. . . . You’ve done
a significant amount of harm financially to your father.” R979, 982.
16
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victim for all losses caused by the defendant.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302
(West 2018) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State asks this Court to affirm.
Respectfully submitted on February 8, 2019.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
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